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Abstract
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human-animal studies – and for human-animal relations – to say so? Responding to these questions with
considerable eloquence and by drawing upon a wide range of references – including 19thcentury theories
of war, Continental theory, actor-network theory, and animal rights philosophy – Dinesh Wadiwel produces
an argument that surprises, provokes and enlightens.
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[Review]
Dinesh Wadiwel. The War Against Animals.
Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015. xii, 302pp.
Philip Armstrong
University of Canterbury
Abstract: Are humans at war with nonhuman animals, either literally or metaphorically? What might it
mean for human-animal studies – and for human-animal relations – to say so? Responding to these
questions with considerable eloquence and by drawing upon a wide range of references – including 19thcentury theories of war, Continental theory, actor-network theory, and animal rights philosophy – Dinesh
Wadiwel produces an argument that surprises, provokes and enlightens.
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THE WAR AGAINST ANIMALS
The thesis of Dinesh Wadiwel’s The War Against Animals is its title. That is to say, a major aim of
the book is to persuade the reader that humans’ relationship to animals, for the most part, really
does constitute an actual state of war. By eloquently spelling out how this claim can be justified,
Wadiwel offers a variety of new and incisive ways of thinking about the politics of human-animal
relations. My experience of reading the book was that, from an original position of some
scepticism (but it’s only a war metaphorically speaking), I soon became convinced of the material
and literal accuracy of the claim.
In the first place, Wadiwel suggests there is no other word, in English at least, that
describes more accurately a relationship that is ‘primarily hostile’, that is more often than not
‘combative or at least focused upon producing harm and death’, and that entails such ‘a
monstrous deployment of violence and extermination’ (Wadiwel, 5, 6). It seems difficult to
disagree with this, once we consider the extent to which modern societies structure humans’
relationship to animals as one of absolute domination, in ways that are almost always enacted
violently or guaranteed by the possibility of violence. The evidentiary examples are
everywhere: the slaughter of agricultural animals, the hunting of wild animals, the culling of
managed wildlife, lethal ‘control’ of pest species, the ‘sacrifice’ of laboratory animals, the
‘euthanasia’ of unwanted companion animals (including the undesirable offspring of pedigree
breeds), and so on and on.
Of course, the claim requires some rethinking of how the idea of ‘war’ should be
understood. Drawing on the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’
treatise On War, Wadiwel conceives it as ‘a phenomenon of mass or corporate organised
violence that aims at total domination’ rather than, more narrowly, as ‘an engagement that is
intentionally fought between two armed combative (human) opponents’ (Wadiwel, 16-17).
And surely this too must be conceded. Even if we confine the definition to human populations,
there is no doubt that wars have throughout history been fought between violent aggressors and
non-combatant populations: total war, collateral damage, collective punishment, blanket
bombing, siege, and genocide – not to mention both terrorism and the ‘war on terror’ – are all
forms of mass belligerence conducted in this fashion.
The first advantage of Wadiwel’s deployment of the notion of war is that it demands
recognition of the overwhelming role of violent domination in humans’ relationships with
animals. In this respect, speaking of a ‘war against animals’ functions as a technique of
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defamiliarisation: a way to provoke us into perceiving in revealingly unfamiliar ways those
common human-animal engagements that we too often take for granted – even (or especially)
those that seem harmless. Because the modern campaign of human mass violence towards
animals is so pervasive, and such a fundamental aspect of the very structure of modern society;
because our food production, our inhabitation of the environment, our medical and
pharmaceutical systems, and even our philosophical conceptualisations of our own being all rest
upon this campaign, it has become normalised and naturalised. Indeed, ‘violence towards
animals is configured as non violence, and … forms of violence are rendered as beneficient’
(Wadiwel, 18). Hence, for example, the limitation of the kind of animal welfare intervention
that aims to deliver the animal to slaughter more quickly, and with less distress or possibility of
resistance. The most ‘humane’, supposedly peaceful, forms of slaughter are the quickest, the
most frictionless; they are those forms of slaughter that allow least possibility for animals to
struggle – which also, of course, happens to make them the most economically advantageous for
the industries that carry them out. For this reason, argues Wadiwel, “we must look for war
precisely where it is discursively coded as “peace”’ (18).
The work of Michel Foucault constitutes a major theoretical influence upon Wadiwel’s
conceptualisation of war as a fundamental structure of modern society. In a series of lectures
published in English under the title Society Must Be Defended, Foucault suggests that war is ‘the
motor behind institutions and order’; that ‘a battlefront runs through the whole of society,
continually and permanently, [so that] [w]e are all inevitably someone’s adversary’ (Foucault,
50-1; qtd in Wadiwel, 19). While Foucault himself shows little or no interest in human-animal
relations, the reformulation of his previous ideas about sovereignty in the light of this later
emphasis on constitutive and endemic social warfare, whereby he comes to perceive sovereignty
as ‘founded upon a continuing victory in war’, proves highly applicable to human-animal
relations (Wadiwel, 19). Here, then, is the next twist in Wadiwel’s defamiliarising but
persuasive reconceptualization of war, which thus becomes ‘almost perfectly internalised as a
mode of sovereignty which bends the will of animals to our own’ (24).
For Wadiwel, ethical and moral-philosophical approaches to animal suffering (Peter
Singer’s utilitarianism, for example, or Tom Regan’s Kantian perspective) fall short precisely
because they fail to interrogate with sufficient thoroughness this internalisation of human
sovereignty over animals. ‘Once we assume we have a right of dominion, then it would seem
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that ethics is forced to attend to questions of how we use this dominion; that is, how we use
animals, rather than whether we should use them in the first place’ (22). Wadiwel treats with
suitable scorn the kind of ‘lifeboat case’ thought-experiment to which analytic philosophers are
so attached. Imagine a dog and four humans in a lifeboat, says Regan, which only has room for
four beings in total: would not the inevitable choice be to throw the dog overboard? As
Wadiwel points out, it is only our belief in the pre-existing sovereignty of humans over animals
that confers on humans the right, responsibility, and capacity to make such calculations in the
first place, or to imagine ourselves doing so. The dog has therefore, as it were, been thrown off
the boat before it was even launched – indeed, before it was built. ‘The challenge’, Wadiwel
insists, ‘is to identify and unpick sovereignty in the first instance, rather than attempt to
construct an ethics after sovereignty has organised hierarchical divisions’ (55). Moralphilosophical approaches are incapable of interrogating this pre-existing condition of
sovereignty, he suggests, because the questions arising from human-animal relationships are
primarily political rather than moral ones.
The first section of War Against Animals, which focuses on biopower, begins by outlining
the notion, drawn from Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt, that sovereign power can be
understood as constituting itself, in a primary and fundamental way, by means of its ability to
carry out lawfully the very acts it forbids in principle: for example the killing of humans (during
war or by means of capital punishment), or their incarceration without trial or redress (again,
during war or other states of emergency). In other words, ‘sovereignty’s definitive power lies
in its ability to constitute exception’ (Wadiwel, 72). By transferring these insights to the domain
of human-animal relations, Wadiwel offers a new way to make sense of the starkest
contradictions in modernity’s legal and political regulation of human-animal relations. How else
to account for that way in which modern legislatures regulate in favour of animals’ welfare with
greater stridency than at any time in history, at the very same time that they legitimise and protect
the industries that carry out the largest-scale and most intrusive exploitation of animals ever
undertaken? To take my own country for example: the Parliament of Aotearoa New Zealand
has passed some of the most progressive animal welfare laws in the world, which include
provisions that recognise animal sentience, prohibit invasive research on apes, and require that
animals in human care must be provided not only with the basic necessities of life but also the
‘opportunity to display normal patterns of behaviour’ (MPI, section 4). Yet simultaneously the
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same legislature passed new codes that permitted the continued use of farrowing crates for pigs,
battery cages for layer hens, and a raft of other practices that blatantly contravene the
requirements of the Act, not least the mandated provision of opportunities to express ‘normal
patterns of behaviour’. This was possible because agriculture, laboratory experimentation,
animal breeding, and so on – that is, those practices that comprise the majority of human-animal
interactions occurring at any given time – were recognised by the law as permitted exceptions
to the principles of animal welfare. These kinds of ‘exceptionary spaces’ operate in just the way
that, during times of war, the state can suspend some of the very democratic rights of its own
citizens that it has otherwise been set up to guarantee (Wadiwel, 82-3). Moreover, it is not
simply that such explicit and extreme contradictions are licensed by sovereign power: according
to Wadiwel they actually embody the very techniques – the creation of states of exception, and
the exercise of legal violence – by which sovereign power enacts itself as such.
If Wadiwel’s first chapter, by concentrating on sovereignty, risks characterising the
biopolitical violence exercised over animals as an invariably centralised or monolithic form of
power, the chapters that follow mitigate that risk. Chapter Two does so by concentrating on
the notion of governmentality – the means by which sovereign power is put into practice across
‘a complex field of action’ and through ‘autonomous systems that do not rely on a centralised
control apparatus’ (Wadiwel, 101). In this sense, again, the war against animals cannot be
understood as resembling a conventional war directed by one ‘high command’ against another.
‘War, in this case, operates through diffused systems of government that sequence and scale
technologies of violence and control to achieve a comprehensive life and death management of
non human animals, securing maximal human utility’ (101). Chapters Three and Four draw on
the theories of Roberto Esposito, in combination with Lockean and Marxist thought, to analyse
the relationship between sovereignty, biopower and property, examining the intimate
complicity between capitalism and the war on animals, which collaborate to produce a ‘violent
form of conversion of the lives of animals into value within a human exchange system’, so that
‘property and commodity cohabit as artefacts of war’ (Wadiwel, 147).
The process of commodification is according to Wadiwel ‘inherently violent’ since it
involves the forced reduction of entities of all kinds into abstract (monetary) values in order that
they can be exchanged. When I first read this I thought it a misappropriation of the word violent,
since giving an object monetary value, although certainly a process of abstraction, does not
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necessarily involve violence. But then I thought (even leaving aside the treatment of animals as
resources and commodities) about the scale of the destruction of material entities – minerals,
trees, land-forms, waterways, oceans, atmospheres – that capitalism has engineered, and about
the acceleration of this destruction within an economic system that now depends on rapid
obsolescence and throwaway consumption. Conceding the violent character of such reckless
overproduction and overconsumption becomes even more unavoidable, as Wadiwel points out,
when we think of the ‘industrialised production of animals for food’, which ‘occurs through a
coerced imposition of death in exchange of life in order to realise value’ (165). I am reminded
in this context of Thoreau’s suggestion in Walden (1854) that the true cost of a thing ‘is the
amount of what I will call life which is required to be exchanged for it, immediately or in the
long run’ (Thoreau, 40). The farming of animals for food, at least via industrial means, depends
precisely upon the refusal to count the cost fully in Thoreau’s terms. It requires, as Wadiwel
puts it, an absolute disregard for ‘what[ever] sort of life the animal may hold, what[ever]
potential this life may possess, what[ever] sort of value the animal’s own life may have
for itself’ (165).
Wadiwel’s characterisation of modern human-animal relations as a war, then, seems to
me immediately compelling as long as he is discussing the scale and viciousness of the many
forms of systemic violence characteristic of industrial slaughter and agriculture, or the kinds of
legitimised torture and incarceration carried out in laboratories by scientists of Harry Harlow’s
type. But he takes on a more difficult challenge when he turns to the kinds of companion-animal
practices beloved of many (though of course not all) animal advocates, especially pet-keeping.
The basis for Wadiwel’s critique of companion animal relationships has been prepared
by his analysis of property. In law, as proponents of animal rights and liberation often point out,
companion animals are subject to ownership, a situation that obviously entails a form of
epistemic violence and thus enables various kinds of material violence. Wadiwel argues that
these property rights over animals also enable the war on animals to be privatised. Chapter Six
begins with a summary of familiar regulations governing dog ownership: such measures involve
‘compulsory body modification, regimes of surveillance, and controls over movement and
bodily function’, and they ‘allow for the categorisation of certain dogs, with reproductive
controls and death for some dogs a certain outcome of this regime’ (203). ‘The fact that
arbitrary controls and discriminatory provisions [of this kind] are tolerable’, writes Wadiwel,
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‘… presupposes that they merely confirm a truth – a right of domination’ (203): in other
words, they operate according to the mode of exception characteristic of the state of war.
However they also, of course, privatise these particular forms of dominion, so that the
enactment of such forms of violence is given over to – indeed required of – private citizens.
Having thereby established grounds for considering modern companion animal
relationships within the broader ‘war against animals’, Wadiwel goes on to confront probably
the most currently influential challenge to his paradigm. This is the strain of theory and analysis,
best exemplified by the work of Donna Haraway, especially in When Species Meet (2008), which
insists that human-animal relations of all kinds should be thought of as spaces of inescapably
complex interchange, in which humans and nonhumans alike exercise agency, share suffering,
and collaborate as co-labourers, playmates, and ‘messmates’, mutually shaping each other as
well as the outcomes of their ‘entanglements’. Thus, for instance, Haraway refers to her own
participation, along with her dog, in agility training, as an ‘historically located, multispecies,
subject-changing encounter in a contact zone fraught with power, knowledge and technique,
moral questions – and the chance for joint, cross-species intervention that is simultaneously
work and play’ (Haraway, 205; cited in Wadiwel, 2017). Later in the same book, and
elsewhere, she also uses the same rhetoric to describe much more lethal kinds of encounter,
including hunting, laboratory experimentation, animal breeding, meat-eating, and animal
agriculture. Wadiwel concedes that ‘Haraway’s project poses a challenge to the framework I
have so far advanced in this book’ (212), since imagining animals as co-workers would seem to
entail the suspension or abandonment of a model of top-down domination or violent
subjugation. Yet Wadiwel’s project, in turn, poses a challenge to Haraway. As he notes,
questions of violence are seldom addressed by Haraway, which can only constitute a
shortcoming if we wish to account in any meaningful way for animals’ own experiences of (for
example) intensive farming, slaughter, blood-sports, commercial breeding, invasive
experimentation, or indeed the forced operations and euthanasias that pet-owners inflict on
their companions. Wadiwel, while he recognises the value of Haraway’s emphasis on
relationality and exchange in human-animal interactions, insists that questions of domination and
violence must be re-inserted into such accounts. To analyse any given instance of co-production
(whether in a slaughterhouse, a vet clinic, or a dog-agility course) ‘we must understand this
exchange and ‘labour’ precisely through the prism of violence’. At the same time ‘[r]esistance[,]
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too, must be understood; the [animal] “worker” in this case must be conceptualised as a resistive
agent, and their productivity understood in context with this resistance against processes of
violence’ (Wadiwel, 213-14).
I find Wadiwel’s call for a renewed attention to the specific forms taken by domination,
resistance, violence, and asymmetry in human-animal interactions especially compelling in this
context, not least because of the very pervasive influence upon human-animal studies of
Haraway’s work, and that of other actor-network-style theorists. In my view (Wadiwel himself
does not say this), this influence too often results in a surrender to analytical vagueness and
political quietism. Too much work is being produced in the field currently (again, in my
opinion) that seems content to cite Haraway’s rhetorical celebrations of inter-relational
complexity – such as her claim that ‘we are in a knot of species coshaping one another in layers
of reciprocating complexity all the way down’ (Haraway, 42; cited in Wadiwel, 206) – as if
such formulations fulfil the requirements of a proper analysis of human-animal relations.
Shouldn’t our analytical responsibility be to untangle such ‘knots’ (etymologically, that’s actually
what analysis means), or at least to trace the interlacing threads that make them up, and to
identify what kinds of power, privilege, subjugation, and violence are bound up in them?
Conceiving of every human-animal interchange as merely another instance of ‘reciprocating
complexity’ risks portraying them as equal, harmless, and therefore undeserving of or
invulnerable to challenge.
To refocus attention on the violence and asymmetry of human-animal interactions does
not, of course, render impossible the recognition of reciprocal relationality – it sharpens it.
Indeed, as Wadiwel points out, it is precisely the continued agency of animals, their ongoing
responsiveness to human interventions, that motivates and mobilises our war against them. In a
vivid and powerful passage, Wadiwel writes:
[a] chicken struggles against a human operator, as it is thrust into the poultry shackle; a
hooked tuna fish, gasping, wrests its body violently on the deck of a ship; a cow
hesitates before being prodded to enter the kill chute; a hog turns away as the captive
bolt pistol misses…. [T]he incentive within industrialised food production will be to
nullify this resistance in order to realise the full value of death: any acts of creativity or
resistance by animals that delay, compromise, or ineffectively congeal value become a
threat to system efficiency. (167)
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The systems of domination Wadiwel describes are engaged in ‘continual adaptation and
reworking’ with the aim of ‘most effectively captur[ing] the agency, escape and vitality of
animals and simultaneously maximis[ing] human use value’ (16). For Wadiwel, human-animal
studies therefore has the responsibility to undertake the crucial task of finding new ways of ‘to
conceptualise how we understand the “truth” of animal resistance, and how intense production
systems work actively to mitigate and silence this political agency’ (296).
By the end of Chapters Six and Seven, then, I was quite convinced that Wadiwel’s
insistent attentiveness to violence and domination offers a necessary (and even urgent)
corrective to the common emphasis on ‘reciprocating complexity’. But the next and final
chapter made me think that the reverse is also true. Because this final chapter happens to focus
on two literary texts with which I am very familiar –Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Moby-Dick (1851)
– I was able to notice problems with Wadiwel’s analysis that arose precisely because of an
under-emphasis on the unceasing dialectics of co-relationality that can be discerned in these
texts, operating simultaneously and in conjunction with regimes of violence and domination.
Discussing Defoe’s novel, Wadiwel relies on Jacques Derrida’s assertion that Crusoe’s ‘long
discussions[s] [with] so many beasts’ comprise ‘a theatre of solitary sovereignty, of the assertion
of mastery’ (Derrida, 28; qtd in Wadiwel, 259). This is accurate, as far as it goes, but it’s not
the whole story. Derrida – as philosophers often will – misses the literary dimension of the
novel, the means by which Defoe shows us, beyond and against the perceptions of his unreliable
narrator Crusoe, that this solitary, sovereign mastery is never complete; that it is, on the
contrary, perpetually anxious, artificial, dependent, and contingent. Defoe shows this precisely
by narrating all the ways in which the beasts on the island resist, surprise, win over, or escape
Crusoe: the feral cat who marches away from him when she pleases, the parrot who devastates
Crusoe’s sense of sovereign self-sufficiency when he unexpectedly speaks Crusoe’s name, the
kid goat he can’t bring himself to slaughter because he’s grown too attached to her.
The same problem recurs when Wadiwel turns to Moby-Dick. Without doubt, the
concept of a ‘war against animals’ applies amply to nineteenth-century whaling, and to Ahab’s
conflict with the White Whale in particular. In fact the repeated inference that Moby-Dick
might be a knowing and deliberate combatant – against whalers, if not against Ahab specifically –
suggests the narrative might conform more to the traditional model of warfare, as a deliberate
hostility between two sovereign entities, than to the wider pattern of the ‘war against animals’.
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Yet Wadiwel’s reading of the novel, like Derrida’s take on Crusoe, overemphasises the force of
both Ahab’s sovereignty and the sovereignty that Ahab (along with Ishmael, the novel’s narrator)
ascribes to the White Whale. While the intimation that the agon between Ahab and Moby-Dick
represents a mutual violent clash between sovereign subjects does indeed pervade the novel,
Melville systematically disrupts and undermines that very perception. He does so by
interpolating, throughout the narrative, a series of chapters that focus on nonhuman elements –
from tools of the whaleman’s trade to parts of the whale’s body (‘The Line’, ‘The Sperm
Whale’s Head’, ‘The Battering-Ram’, ‘The Tail’, ‘Ahab’s Leg’, ‘The Forge’, ‘The Life-Buoy’) –
each of which turns out to play a vital agentive part in the climactic events: the head of the
whale, used as a battering-ram, sinks the ship; the tail destroys the whaleboats; the re-forged
harpoon pierces the whale’s body; the line catches around Ahab’s neck and drags him to his
death; Queequeg’s coffin provides the ‘life-buoy’ that allows Ishmael to survive and tell the tale.
In other words, Melville portrays the overall engagement as a network of agencies that coproduce the outcome, rather than a single combat between sovereign entities, while never
failing to observe the surges of violence and power that saturate events. Recognising these
elements would have enabled Wadiwel to round out his argument with an analysis that
illustrated the way in which his emphasis on vectors of domination and violence has the capacity
to combine with, and enrich, the kind of co-relational model advanced by Haraway and other
advocates of actor-network approaches.
The War against Animals is a timely, necessary, and creatively provocative book – one
that deserves to become a touchstone for human-animal studies researchers from all disciplinary
backgrounds. Of course no overarching theory has all the answers, and it is no discredit to
Wadiwel that at moments his argument demonstrates a need for the insights provided by other
perspectives – especially in order to account more fully for the non-violent, non-hostile feelings
and relationships that co-exist with the forms of sovereignty, violence, and dominion that this
book so devastatingly diagnoses. After all, even the grimmest of wars cannot utterly extinguish
the possibilities for generosity between combatants, or for resistant collaboration and
conscientious objection.

246

THE WAR AGAINST ANIMALS

Works Cited
Derrida, Jacques. The Beast and the Sovereign Vol. 2. University of Chicago Press, 2009.
Foucault, Michel. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76.
Penguin, 2004.
Haraway, Donna. When Species Meet. University of Minnesota Press, 2008.
MPI (Ministry for Primary Industries). Animal Welfare Act. New Zealand Government, 1999.
Thoreau, Henry David. Walden. Folio, 1980.

247

